DEP Releases Report on April Flooding Agency Action and Response Appropriate

September 22, 2005

As Americans in the south of our country grapple with unprecedented devastation suffered at the hands of Hurricane Katrina, our region is on the slow road to recovery from losses suffered by homeowners and businesses and the destruction of roadways, bridges and other infrastructure across several counties as a result of the April 2005 floods that dealt such a severe blow. When heavy rains struck Ulster County this past Spring, we watched as waters rapidly rose to levels not seen here in decades. There was a hue and cry from some that the New York City Department of Environmental Protection might bear some responsibility in contributing to this scenario by "releasing" reservoir waters downstream. This belief fostered an air of contempt for the agency charged with the stewardship of New York City’s drinking water and surrounding Watershed lands. Rather than point fingers, I approached the DEP with a request for a meeting to review the events of that fateful weekend with an eye towards determining what factors were in play and what could be done to prevent such a catastrophe in the future.

I met with DEP Commissioner Emily Lloyd, Deputy Commissioner Michael Principe and Assistant Commissioner Mark Lanaghan in their New York City offices on June 10, 2005. DEP reservoir management practices were foremost among the topics discussed. During the course of our conversation DEP officials assured that, contrary to the claims of some, they did not release any waters during these rains. In fact, as of October 1980, they maintain a no-release policy that includes a specific agreement NOT to do so at the Ashokan Reservoir. (Stipulation of Discontinuance Index No. 5840/80)

According to these officials, normal operating procedures included drawing water levels down in two separate basins in anticipation of controlling annual snowmelt and rain. As of March 28, 2005, one basin, previously drawn down, was filled by snowmelt and rains. The April 2nd storm caused major spillage from Basin One to Basin Two, and eventual spillage into the Ashokan. An estimated 20 billion gallons of water came down during this time. Importantly, these reservoirs were not designed for flood control, but to capture and hold water and specifically not release it quickly. While in the past there was a technique that allowed for the "wasting" of water downstream, construction of the SUNY Ashokan Field Campus has eliminated this capability due to the flooding that would ensue on its lands. If the DEP had released waters, as some alleged, it would have flooded this Campus. In fact, DEP engineers say they would have had to anticipate this storm at least one month in advance to have made any arrangement that would have had any significant impact on the flow of water in the lower bodies. This points out that indeed, if the Ashokan Reservoir did not exist, this storm would have, in essence, wiped out the homes and inhabitants of Olivebridge.

At the conclusion of this lengthy meeting, follow up plans called for DEP publication of a report on their management practices and their impact, if any, on the events of April 2-4, 2005. I am pleased to note that I recently received a copy of the full report entitled "New York City Water Supply Reservoir Operations and Downstream Flooding Mitigation during the April 2-4, 2005 Storm." An accompanying letter written by Michael A. Principe, Ph.D., states the following: "The report amply demonstrates two fundamental points. First, DEP staff acted appropriately and swiftly to protect water quality, the water supply infrastructure and surrounding properties from what was a major regional rain event. Second, far from ‘causing’ the floods, New York City reservoirs diminished peak flow rates downstream and prevented even worse damage from occurring." During the April 2005 event, peak flows downstream of the Ashokan Reservoir were 40% lower than peak flows upstream. A copy of this report is available for review at my Kingston District Office.

Commissioner Lloyd wholeheartedly agreed, at the conclusion of our meeting, to continue a dialogue on this and other topics relevant to DEP practices in the 101st Assembly District and the entire Watershed region. A key point that warrants further discussion is the responsibility of local municipalities to regulate local planning and development in light of flooding problems caused by structures built in flood plains downstream from reservoirs. Natural flood plains allow for overflow when "watercourses" become swollen from rainwater. Whether or not reservoirs exist, homes and businesses built in these areas will flood during high precipitation events.

In conclusion, while it may have been politically expedient to point the finger at the DEP or some "villain," such tactics do not help us recover from this tragedy or prepare for the future. We must continue our united efforts to recover from the substantial losses suffered by so many and use solid information for future planning and community education to hopefully prevent this "perfect storm" scenario from occurring again.

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